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Abstract 
There seems to be confusion and disagreement among scholars about the meaning 
of interpersonal forgiveness. In this essay we shall venture to clarify the meaning 
of forgiveness by examining various literary works. In particular, we shall discuss 
instances of forgiveness from Homer’s The Iliad, Euripides’ Hippolytus, and 
Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics and we shall focus on the changes that the concept 
of forgiveness has gone through throughout the centuries, in the hope of being able 
to understand, and therefore, of being able to use more accurately, contemporary 
notions of forgiveness. We shall also explore the relationship between forgiveness 
and concepts that are closely associated with it, such as anger/resentment, hurt, 
clemency, desert/merit, excuse, etc. 
 




With forgiveness, as with so much else, the thought of the Ancient Greeks 
provides a basis for Western thinking - a basis and a wealth of paradigms. We will 
start our exploration here with the Ancient Greek concept of ‘syngnome.’ 
‘Syngnome’ derives from the verb ‘syngignoskein,’ which literally means ‘being 
of the same opinion,’ or ‘having a common understanding.’1 ‘Syngnome’ is 
primarily a cognitive term that implies one is able to adopt the other’s point of 
view. 
 
1.  The Iliad, Book XXIV (8th Century BCE) 
In Book XXIV of the Iliad there is no mention of forgiveness, yet when we 
study carefully its details, we will recognise not only that it occurs, but also that it 
plays a major role in the understanding of this particular book. The central, and 
perhaps most moving scene of the book, and arguably of the whole Iliad, is the 
meeting between the aged Priam, the king of Troy, whose brave son Hector, the 
best Trojan warrior, was killed on the battlefield by Achilles, the best Greek 
warrior. Achilles has killed Hector in order to avenge the death of his dear friend 
Patroclus. In his attempt to alleviate his pain and his sense of loss, Achilles has 
been abusing the body of Hector by tying it behind his chariot and dragging it 
around Patroclus’ tomb. He keeps doing this endlessly, aimlessly. It is as if 
Achilles wants to replace his uncontrollable grief with anger and revenge by 
abusing the dead body of his beloved friend’s killer. Yet, it is clear that Achilles’ 




pain is so deep that even this horrific abuse of Hector’s body is incapable of 
providing any real relief. 
It is important to note that this meeting between Priam and Achilles did not 
take place out of either man’s sheer ‘free will.’ It was ordained by Zeus, the father 
of gods.2 When Priam meets Achilles in the latter’s tent, he introduces himself 
with an act of supplication and asks Achilles to honour the gods and remember his 
own aged father.3 He begs Achilles to take pity upon h
 
Honour then the gods, Achilles, and take pity upon me 
remembering your father, yet I am still more pitiful; 
I have gone through what no other mortal on earth has gone 
through; 
I put my lips to the hands of the man who has killed my 
children.4 
 
Achilles cannot help but be moved by Priam’s words. Both men cry remembering 
the awfulness of war and the losses that each had suffered. In the end, Achilles 
gives back Hector’s body, and receives Priam’s ransom.  
The question emerging here is the following: Is this a scene of ‘forgiveness,’ 
(‘syngnome’)? We would like to argue that yes, it is. Surely, it is a peculiar sense 
of ‘syngnome’ where the two mortals are ‘compelled,’ so to speak, by a god to 
come together, and no one asks for forgiveness or apologises for the horrors each 
had caused (directly or indirectly) the other. Yet, does not Achilles offer 
‘syngnome’ to Priam, when he allows him to stay in his tent? Is it not a 
‘syngnome’ when Achilles orders an elaborate dinner in order to sit and eat with 
Priam, the father of his beloved friend’s killer, even though he had just eaten?5 
Likewise, is it not an act of ‘syngnome’ when Priam goes as a suppliant to his 
son’s killer’s tent? By seeing each other’s humanity and common lot they are both 
able to empathise with one another and have an understanding. By remembering 
his own father, Achilles realises that Priam is very much like a father, who is also 
regal, beautiful and respectful. Priam realises that Achilles is not simply a killing 
monster, as Hecuba, his wife had claimed Achilles to be. He is also beautiful and 
worthy of respect. In a way, one gets the notion that if it were not for this awful 
war, both he and Priam might have been friends. War is the only one to blame.  
 
2.  Forgiveness in Euripides’ Hippolytus (5th Century BCE) 
In Euripides’ Hippolytus there is also a similar ‘command’ by a god for an 
‘understanding,’ or ‘syngnome,’ but this time the wrongdoer himself asks for 
forgiveness and the wronged party willingly grants it. The two mortals involved 
this time are Hippolytus and his father Theseus. Theseus, not realising that his 
wife, Phaedra, lied when she accused his son, and her stepson, Hippolytus of 
defiling their bed, curses Hippolytus to destruction. The curse is inevitably 
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realized, as it is a gift from the god Poseidon, and Hippolytus finds a tragic death 
when his chariot horses panic and flee, dragging him over the rocks of Trozen. 
Despite Hippolytus’ protestations, Theseus, still hurting from the death of his dear 
wife, is determined not to listen or believe his son. Only when the goddess Artemis 
reveals the truth to Theseus, does he understand the gravity of his offence: he 
killed not only an innocent person, but his dear son. While Hippolytus is on his 
deathbed, Theseus asks desperately for forgiveness, which Hippolytus grants. 
Hippolytus is the only mortal in the play who actively forgives, and Theseus is the 
only mortal who is forgiven. The gods do not forgive despite the old slave’s 
pleading with Aphrodite to forgive Hippolytus because ‘gods ought to be wiser 
than mortals.’ 
This instance of forgiveness in Hippolytus is both similar and different to the 
one discussed in the Iliad. In both scenes there are two mortals who have a 
common understanding, and a realisation of their common humanity and mortal 
nature. In both works the gods will that a common understanding or forgiveness 
occurs. But in addition, in Hippolytus, the two mortals Theseus and Hippolytus 
‘forgive’ each other because Artemis’ revelation showed that they were both 
ignorant and constrained by the higher power of a god: Aphrodite.  
Given that every mortal character in the play is guilty, it is easy to see that each 
is also concerned with ‘forgiveness,’ ‘pardon’ and ‘excusal.’6 However, we see 
that in the last scene the word used by Euripides is not only ‘syngnome,’ but also 
‘aphiemi’ meaning ‘to absolve or discharge.’ The word occurs when Theseus asks 
in 1450 ‘do you ‘aphies’ (i.e. ‘discharge,’ or ‘absolve’) me of bloodguiltiness?’ 
The use of the word ‘aphiemi’ is significant. It indicates that in order for 
‘syngnome’ to occur, there must be a discharge of the horrible crime by the 
wronged party. Given that the word ‘aphesis’ will later be used primarily to mean 
Christian forgiveness, the use of a similar word in Hippolytus is of great 
significance. We begin to see here how the concept of Greek ‘forgiveness’ 
(‘syngnome’) is being ‘enriched’ so to speak, and ultimately changed, by the 
addition of closely-related concepts, i.e., ‘aphesis,’ ‘eleutheros phonou,’ (freeing 
from pain) etc.  
 
3.  ‘Syngnome’ in Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics (4th Century BCE) 
Aristotle uses the concept of ‘syngnome’ mainly in Books III and VII, when he 
talks about voluntary actions and akrasia, or weakness of the will, respectively. In 
Book III 1110a24 he tells us that there is ‘syngnome’ when a person’s acts are 
either due to ignorance of the relevant information, or due to extreme force that no 
human would endure. Aristotle points out that what makes an action involuntary, 
and thus forgivable, is ignorance of the particular circumstances. (In other words, 
one cannot claim that one is ignorant of the universals, such as ‘drinking and 
driving is wrong.’ However, if an agent, unbeknownst to her, was given a drink 
that was alcoholic and drove under the influence, she will be committing an 
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involuntary act, and as such, she is both forgiveness- or pardon-worthy.) It is 
curious that Aristotle, who wrote in the 4th Century BCE, and several years after 
Euripides, is here using not only the words ‘syngnome’ but also ‘eleos’ to signify 
‘excuse,’ ‘pity’ and ‘pardon.’ The word ‘eleos’ will also be used later by 
Christianity to signify a closely-related concept of forgiveness: pity, mercy, pardon 
and compassion. So, now we see that the concept of ‘forgiveness’ is going through 
a transformation: it does not simply refer to strict cognition and common 
understanding, or shared point of view; it now includes sharing of emotion, such as 
pity and compassion. 
In Book V Aristotle is again talking about involuntary actions and tells us in 
1136a that some are forgiveness-worthy, whereas others are not. All wrongdoings 
that are due to ignorance and done in ignorance are ‘syngnomika.’ For instance, if I 
am late to a meeting because, due to a glitch in my computer, I did not receive the 
latest email with the relevant information, then I am both late in ignorance and due 
to ignorance. However, involuntary actions which are done in ignorance, but are 
due to ignorance because of some kind of passion, are to be blamed and thus are 
not forgivable or ‘syngnomonika.’ For instance, if I hit a pedestrian because I am 
drunk and do not know what I am doing, then my action, although done in 
ignorance, is not excusable or forgivable, because the ignorance is due to my 
passion of ‘drinking excessively.’ 
In Book VII, 1149b1-5 Aristotle discusses akrasia, and why some akratic 
actions are forgiveness-worthy. Akrasia due to ‘one’s spirited nature, or ‘thumos,’ 
is forgivable because it is capable of listening to reason, and is thus less shameful. 
However akrasia due to ‘epithumia,’ i.e., desire, is incapable of listening to reason 
and thus, is unforgivable. The reason given for this is that it is more forgiveness-
worthy to follow natural desires that are common to all. 
Several scholars, including Griswold, have wondered why Aristotle does not 
praise forgiveness as one of the virtues.7 Griswold’s view is that the answer lies in 
Aristotle’s perfectionist conception of Ethics. That is, the virtuous person, like a 
true ‘megalopsuchos,’ would be perfect, and therefore would already have all the 
virtues/excellences, and consequently would never do something that requires 
forgiveness. We, on the other hand, wish to argue that although it is true that 
Aristotle saw the virtues as excellences of character, he did not praise forgiveness 
because he thought that justice and its fellow virtues are much more important for 
an ethical theory. Indeed, without justice human life would be impossible and 
unbearable. Yet, without forgiveness, life is still possible. In other words, justice is 
a necessity, while ‘forgiveness’ is a contingent ‘good.’  
This perhaps helps us understand why the gods in Ancient Greek literature, are 
not forgiving towards humans. For instance, we see in Hippolytus that although 
Artemis orders humans to forgive, she herself does not. Additionally, Aphrodite is 
intent on punishing the wrongdoer and she is deaf to the pleading words of 
Hippolytus’ servant to be forgiving! We believe that the reason for this is that for 





the gods the most important virtue is justice and the attribution of order. The gods 
would like to instill in humans the idea that they [humans] could and ought to be 
just like themselves [the gods]. This type of justice allows for ‘syngnome’ in cases 
where the agent is not responsible for the wrong action. However, they would not 
allow for a system of Ethics built on forgiveness where agents are both responsible 
for the wrong action, and culpable. For such Ethics faces the danger of 
sidestepping ‘justice’ in favour of ‘forgiveness,’ as it is less onerous to do the 
wrong thing and then be forgiven, than striving to always be excellent and just.  
So, Aristotle and earlier Greek writers do not praise forgiveness as a virtue, not 
simply because the virtuous individual is too perfect to do something wrong, and 
thus he or she does not need forgiveness; rather Aristotle thinks that justice and the 
other practical virtues are more important to serve as a foundation in his ethical 
system than forgiveness. 
If space permitted, we would indicate here the way that these ancient ideas of 
forgiveness are reflected, altered, and enlarged upon in much later literary works: 
notably Shakespeare’s Cymbeline, (early 17th century), which, when viewed from 
this perspective, offers an extraordinary range of forgiveness, some of it easily 
achieved; some like that of Achilles or Hippolytus, hard sought. But that must be 
the subject for another chapter. 
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